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1 Introduction
There is persistent inequality in educational achievement and labour market outcomes
between different social groups in both developed and developing societies. Gender dis-
parity in career choices and employment conditions, as well as unequal education and
labour market outcomes between individuals belonging to different religious and ethnic
groups are recurrently observed. A very relevant case in the context of our study is
the worldwide persistent disadvantage of native populations.1 In Australia in particu-
lar, indigenous people systematically have less favorable educational and labour market
outcomes compared to non-indigenous people (Altman, 2000; Dulleck et al., 2016). Affir-
mative action is widly used as a policy tool to reduce these patterns of inequality. Such
policies give preferential treatment to specific groups of people to compensate for their
disadvantaged trajectory, influenced by socioeconomic background, historical discrimina-
tion or stereotypes. For instance, in the United States many programs promote minorities
in the labour market and higher education institutions. In India, quota systems are in
place to favour representation of women and people from lower castes in government
and higher education institutions. In Australia, many universities and employers try to
achieve participation of indigenous people, at least equivalent to their representation in
the Australian population. Despite its popularity, it is still debated in the theoretical
and experimental literature whether affirmative action increases or decreases the effort
exerted by individuals benefitting from such policies (Coate and Loury, 1993).
We investigate whether affirmative action influences effort of low performing stu-
dents, in an experiment conducted in socioeconomically disadvantaged high schools with
a large representation of indigenous Australians. In these schools, students are regularly
exposed to affirmative action encouraging indigenous students to improve their educa-
tional outcomes. In our experiment, participants perform a simple real-effort task in a
competitive setting with monetary incentives. Those whose performance is within the
top third of the distribution receive a high piece-rate payment, whereas the remaining
participants receive a low piece-rate payment. In this setting, we test whether a positive
handicap given to the bottom third performers influences effort in a subsequent stage.
Our results indicate that affirmative action increases effort of those that the rule aims to
favour. Moreover, the discouraging effect on those who are not benefited (but indirectly
penalised) by affirmative action is at best small.
Typically, laboratory experiments have investigated the incentive effects of affirmative
action with an asymmetric tournament setting, where a competitive disadvantage is
1See, for example, Patrinos and Sakellariou (1992) for Canada, Bradley et al. (2007) for Australia,
Ladson-Billings (2006) for the US, Patrinos and Hall (2004) for Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico
and Peru.
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experienced by part of the participants. For instance, early laboratory experiments with
a standard participant pool by Schotter and Weigelt (1992) use a tournament setting
with an abstract framing, where effort consists of choosing a number which decreases
the payoff according to a specified cost function, and the disadvantage is introduced
by varying the parameters of the cost function between participants. In accordance
with their theoretical predictions (see also Lazear and Rosen, 1981), the authors show a
positive effect of affirmative action on abstract effort choices.
Closely related to our study, Calsamiglia et al. (2013) test whether affirmative ac-
tion affects performance in a logic-based task (sudoku) in a tournament setting. Their
participants were primary school children from two different schools. Each child in one
school was matched with another child in the other school and each pair performed the
task under a competitive payment scheme. The authors manipulated the within pair
competitive capacity by giving training at the task in a prior stage to participants in one
of the schools. In this setting, affirmative action is introduced by giving a bonus to the
participants who did not receive the training. The results indicate that affirmative action
compensating for unequal experience in the task increased the performance of those who
benefited from the policy and did not discourage the performance of the participants who
were indirectly penalised by the policy. The authors also find that the encouraging effect
of affirmative action on the experience disadvantaged participants is not dependent on
the different modalities of the policy (high versus low and lump-sum versus proportional
bonus). Our experiment is distinct from the one by Calsamiglia et al. (2013) for two
very important reasons. First, in our study affirmative action does not compensate for
unequal experience (resulting from experimental manipulation) in a cognitively demand-
ing task, but for unequal effort in an effort-based task. We use affirmative action to
compensate for the unequal performance in a task where unequal effort plays a major
role in explaining the disparity in performance. Hence, the goal of affirmative action is to
encourage students who would provide little effort without the policy. Second, unlike in
Calsamiglia et al. (2013), our participants belong to particularly disadvantaged socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. They are students in socioeconomically disadvantaged schools, with
a large representation of indigenous students and that partner with a non-governmental
organisation that offers encouragement programs and learning support to these students.
By focusing on the effect of affirmative action on effort of disadvantaged students, our
study makes a very relevant contribution to the experimental literature from an external
validity perspective and in its implications for public policy. This is because the persis-
tent social gradient in education is often associated with lower motivation and effort in
school by socially disadvantaged students.
Laboratory experiments are a very valuable tool to study the incentive effects of af-
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firmative action. A major reason is that such policies are often adopted endogenously,
challenging the interpretation of its causal effects by means of observational data.2 More-
over, ethical and political considerations prevent conducting field experiments on such
policies, with a valid counterfactual. Nonetheless, standard participants in experiments
may not offer a good representation of the population targeted by affirmative action and
fail to provide accurate predictions on how affirmative action influences behaviour (see
Falk and Fehr, 2003). A threat to external validity also holds by a simple experimental
manipulation of participants’ ability at a task.
To increase external validity base their experimental design on a real disadvantage
experienced by part of the participants. Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) and Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007), for instance, base their experimental design on the gender gap in
competitive preferences, which exists outside of the laboratory. Both studies test in a
standard laboratory setting whether affirmative action reduces the gender gap in tour-
nament entry decisions. Using effort-based and cognitively demanding tasks, they find
that affirmative action doubles tournament entry for women and decreases tournament
entry for men.
Another related study by Dulleck et al. (2015) tests in a laboratory experiment con-
ducted concurrently in Australia and in China, whether affirmative action influences
effort in a mathematical task performed in a tournament setting. The participant pool
allows for a large disadvantage in performance for half of the participants and a real
stereotype. The experimental design rests on the existence of a negative stereotype with
respect to the mathematical skills of Australians, compared to Chinese participants. The
authors find that affirmative action does not affect performance when it compensates for
a real disadvantage. However, it may discourage performance of those who benefit from
the policy in the absence of a disadvantage (in an alternative non-stereotypical task).
Their experimental design does not allow to investigate the effect of affirmative action
on the non-beneficiaries.
Our study follows the existing literature by having participants performing a task
in a competitive setting and providing the disadvantaged participants with a positive
handicap. The innovation in our study is that we apply affirmative action to encourage
effort at a pure effort task of socioeconomically disadvantaged high school students,
who would provide low effort in the absence of the policy. Moreover, the specificity
of our participant pool, which predominantly belongs to a disadvantaged socioeconomic
2Many studies have investigated the incentive effects of affirmative using existing data. For instance,
some studies have reported the effects of affirmative action on admission to college of minority students
using policy simulations (see Arcidiacono, 2005; Howell, 2010). Other studies explored policy shifts in
the US on university admissions of minority students (see Card and Krueger, 2005; Long, 2004). In the
labour market context, Leonard (1990) and Miller and Segal (2012) investigated how affirmative action
influences employment of women and black people.
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background and with a large representation of individuals who are exposed to affirmative
action in their real environment, brings the realism of field data to our experiment.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the experimen-
tal design and participant pool, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 summarises
and discusses the findings.
2 Description of the experiment
2.1 Task and treatments
Participants perform a real-effort task in two stages. The task consists of counting the
number of shaded squares in a grid with a total of fifty squares, as shown in Figure 1
below. Each time the participant enters an answer, a new grid appears on the computer
screen.
Figure 1: Experimental task
How many squares in the grid are shaded?
The first stage of the task is identical for all participants in the experiment. They
perform the task for eight minutes. Those ranked in the top third of the performance
distribution receive 15 cents per correct answer, and all the remaining participants receive
5 cents per correct answer. Ties are broken randomly by the experimental software.
Subsequently, participants are asked to guess their rank. After guessing their rank, each
participant is informed about his or her total number of correct answers in the first stage
and whether he or she was ranked in the top third.
In the second stage of the task, participants perform the exact same task. However,
we now introduce two different treatments, the baseline and affirmative action treatment.
In the baseline treatment, the payoffs are calculated exactly as in the first stage. In the
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affirmative action treatment, participants who are ranked in the bottom third of the
performance distribution in stage 1 receive a starting advantage of 15 points, added to
their number of correct answers in stage 2 to determine their score. The score in stage 2
is then determined by their actual number of correct answers in stage 2 plus 15.3 For all
other participants, that is, those ranked above the bottom third, the score is determined
by their number of correct answers in stage 2 only. Participants whose score is in the top
third receive 15 cents per correct answer. All the other participants receive 5 cents per
correct answer. The starting advantage increases the chances for the lowest performers
to be ranked among the top performers in the second stage, and therefore, receiving the
high piece-rate payment. However, only their number of correct answers enters in the
payoff calculation. As in the first stage, participants are asked to guess their rank after
performing the second stage of the task.
In both the baseline and affirmative action treatment, before performing the second
stage, participants are informed about whether one-third of the participants in the room
is receiving the 15 extra points in the second stage. If that is the case, they are also told
whether they are one of the participants receiving the extra points.
We test whether affirmative action influences effort of the lowest performers by com-
paring the within subject variation in performance between the two stages, between the
baseline and affirmative action condition. We also test whether affirmative action impacts
the effort of participants who are not targeted by affirmative action, but are indirectly
penalised when the lowest performers are given a starting advantage. Furthermore, we
investigate whether there are efficiency gains or losses from affirmative action.
3The size of the starting advantage was defined following the observation of students’ performance
in the task in a pilot session, with students in the same age group as our participants but who did not
participate in the experiment. By giving 15 extra points to all participants in the bottom third, half of
them were lifted to the top-third.
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Table 1: Description of the treatments
Baseline Affirmative action
Stage 1 Participants whose number of correct answers is in the top 3rd of the distri-
bution get the high piece-rate payment. All the others get the low piece-rate
payment.
Stage 2 As in stage 1. Participants whose number of cor-
rect answers is below the bottom
3rd in stage 1 receive 15 extra points
in stage 2. Participants whose score
(number of correct answers + ex-
tra points) is in the top 3rd, receive
the high piece-rate payment for each
correct answer. All the others re-
ceive the low piece-rate payment.
After performing the two stages of the task, participants are asked to answer a short
questionnaire, asking basic demographic information (gender, date of birth, year level,
indigenous status). They are also asked whether English is the primary language spoken
at home, who they live with and their parents’ or caregivers’ occupation. Additionally,
participants are asked questions about the enjoyable and difficulty aspects of the task
and the clarity of the instructions.4 Fifty-three percent of the participants considered
the task entertaining, 42 percent found it a bit long and 5 percent found it boring. Forty-
four percent found the task easy, 55 percent not too hard and only 2 percent considered
it very hard. With regards to the clarity of the instructions, 80 percent found them
easy to follow, 18 percent a bit confusing and only 2 percent found them very confusing.
Finally, we asked participants whether they received extra points in the second stage of
the task. The answers allow us to control in our analysis for participants’ understanding
of a fundamental element of our experimental design.
2.2 Experimental procedures
All experimental sessions were conducted by the same experimenter (first author in this
study) and a research assistant. Only one treatment was conducted in each session
and each participant took part in one session only. The experiments were conducted
4At the end of the questionnaire, participants are asked the following questions: “How did you like the
task?” (answer options: “Entertaining”, “A bit long”, “Boring”), “How did you find the task?” (answer
options: “Easy”, “Not too hard”, “Hard”), “How did you find the instructions?” (answer options: ”Easy
too follow”, “A bit confusing”, “Very confusing”).
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during regular school hours and lasted around 60 minutes. A teacher was always present
during the sessions, so that the participants would perceive the experiment as a formal
activity. All participants received the exact same instructions. The instructions for
all tasks were given aloud at the beginning of the session, following a written script
(see Appendix A.2). Examples were used to illustrate each the tasks and participants
were encouraged to ask questions to ensure a good understanding of the tasks and the
associated payoff structure. Subsequently, participants performed the tasks individually
on a website, programmed with the experimental software Coral (Schaffner, 2013) and
specifically designed for our experiment.5 Once participants started performing the tasks,
all questions were answered privately. The experimental webpages displayed screens with
a brief summary of the instructions before participants started to perform each stage of
the task.
Participants received 7 Australian dollars as a participation fee, plus an extra amount
depending on their performance in the task. They could earn up to 14 Australian dollars.
Although they were given monetary incentives for higher performance in the two stages
of the task, only one stage randomly selected at the end of the session, determined their
final payoff. At the start of the experiment, participants were aware of the participation
fee and the payoff scheme in the task. At the end of the experiment, we asked the teacher
present in the room to draw a ball from a bag, containing two balls of different colours,
to determine which of the stages of the task was paid. The payoffs were distributed to
each participant privately in cash, immediately at the end of the session.
The study was approved by the Queensland Department of Education, Training and
Employment, and by the Queensland University of Technology ethics committee.
2.3 Participant pool
We conducted the experiments between September and November 2015, with a total of
263 high school students, enrolled in Year 8 and Year 9 (aged between 13 and 15), in
four public schools located in metropolitan areas in the Australian State of Queensland.6
The schools are characterised by similar and below national average socio-educational
advantage indicators. They also have large numbers of indigenous students and partner
with non-governmental organisations that offer encouragement and learning support pro-
grams for these students. A student is classified as indigenous if he or she self-identifies
as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.7 Within each participating school, all stu-
5The screenshots of the experimental website are provided in Appendix A.3.
6Two of the participating schools are located in metropolitan areas in South East Queensland, and
the other two are located in a metropolitan area in North East Queensland.
7In Queensland, 7.1 percent of primary and high school students identify as indigenous. In public
schools, the proportion of self-identified indigenous students is 8.9 percent (Steering Committee Review
of Government Service Provision, 2015). In the four participating schools, the percentage of indigenous
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dents enrolled in Year 8 and Year 9 were invited to participate. All participants received
an information letter briefly describing what their participation would involve, and were
required to return the consent of their parents or caregivers for participation.
We present the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample in Table 2. It counts
with a total of 55 students who identify as indigenous and 208 students who do not
identify as indigenous. Fifty-four percent of the participants are enrolled in Year 8 and
46 percent are enrolled in Year 9. Our sample is balanced in terms of gender. There is
some variation across treatments, which is due to the fact that we conducted few sessions
(16 in total) and one treatment per session. We also have information with regards
to participants’ achievement in math and English subjects obtained from the principal
teacher. We do not observe significant differences in the achievement distribution between
treatments.8 In addition, 9 percent of the students in our sample have been held back
in school at least one year. We also observe that the large majority of our participants
(92 percent) primarily speak English at home. With regards to participants’ living
situation, 54 percent live with both parents and 42 percent live with only one of their
parents. With respect to parents’ occupation, 26 percent of the participants indicated
that their mother is unemployed or a housewife, whereas only 6 percent declared that
their father is unemployed. The father’s occupation of 51 percent of our participants
is classified as low skill (e.g. construction worker, truck driver, miner) and this also is
the case for the mother’s occupation of 25 percent of the participants (typically, cashier
at a supermarket, waitress or cleaner). Nineteen percent of the participants indicated
that their mother is a nurse or caregiver, 8 percent indicated that their mother has an
administrative job and 3 percent indicated that their mother is a teacher. With regards
to the father’s occupation of the remaining participants, 6 percent indicated that the
father is a technician, 5 percent that he has an administrative job, works in the army or
police and only 2 percent indicated that the father has a high skilled job (e.g. engineer,
medical doctor).
students in the school population is 7, 11, 19 and 27 percent.
8The p-value of the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test is 0.39 for math and 0.25 for English scores.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the participant pool
Baseline Affirmative action Total
N % N % N %
Non-indigenous 112 87 96 72 208 79
Indigenous 17 13 38 28 55 21
Year 8 96 74 46 34 142 54
Year 9 33 26 88 66 121 46
Female 57 44 71 53 128 49
Male 72 56 63 47 135 51
Math grade (1=worst; 5=best)
1 9 7 6 5 15 6
2 11 9 17 13 28 11
3 43 34 56 42 99 38
4 41 33 33 25 74 29
5 22 17 21 16 43 17
English grade
1 1 1 0 0 1 0
2 9 7 14 11 23 9
3 62 48 55 43 117 46
4 42 33 58 45 100 39
5 14 11 1 1 15 6
Were held back in school 13 10 11 8 24 9
Speak English at home 121 94 120 90 241 92
Family living situation
Both parents 76 59 65 49 143 54
Single-parent 47 36 63 47 110 42
Other 6 5 6 4 12 4
Mother occupation
Unemployed/housewife 32 25 37 28 69 26
Low skill job 32 25 35 26 67 25
Administration 11 9 10 7 21 8
Army/police 1 1 1 1 2 1
Business owner 1 1 0 0 1 0
Nurse/care 25 19 24 18 49 19
Teacher 4 3 4 3 8 3
Other 23 18 23 17 46 17
Father occupation
Unemployed 5 4 10 7 15 6
Low skill job 70 54 64 48 134 51
Admin/manager 8 6 5 4 13 5
Army/police 10 8 3 2 13 5
Business owner 1 1 2 1 3 1
Nurse/care 2 2 4 3 6 2
Technician 8 6 8 6 16 6
High skill job 1 1 4 3 5 2
Other 24 19 34 25 58 22
Total 129 100 134 100 263 100
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3 Results
3.1 Descriptive analysis
We conducted 16 sessions in total, including 7 sessions for the affirmative action treat-
ment and 9 sessions for the baseline treatment. On average, 16 participants took part in
each session. We start with a descriptive analysis of the data in Table 3 and Figures 2, 3
and 4. We describe the data for the whole sample, and for two subsamples. We consider
the subsample of participants ranked in the bottom third of the performance distribution
in stage 1 and the subsample of participants ranked above the bottom third threshold.
In Table 3, we report the performance mean (average number of correct answers) and
standard deviation in stage 1, stage 2 as well as the average difference in performance
between the two stages (no. of correct answers in stage 2 - no. of correct answers
in stage 1), separately by treatment. On average, participants answered 25 questions
correctly in the first stage, in both the baseline and affirmative action treatment (the
p-value for the difference between treatments is 0.98). Likewise, within each subsample,
none of the differences in average performance in stage 1 across treatments is statistically
significant at conventional levels. When restricting the sample to the bottom third of
the performance distribution in stage 1, the average number of correct answers is 18.33
and 17.09 in the baseline and affirmative action treatment respectively (p-value=0.23).
For the subsample of participants ranked above the bottom third threshold, the average
number of correct answers in stage 1 is 28.7 and 29.3 in the baseline and affirmative
action treatment respectively (p-value=0.41). We also observe that standard deviations
are relatively large, pointing out heterogeneous performance between participants.
The progression in performance between stage 1 and stage 2 is positive and statisti-
cally significant in both treatments. This is likely to be explained by a learning effect, as
participants may become better at the task after the first stage. For the whole sample,
the performance in stage 2 increased by 2.42 and 2.93 correct answers in the baseline and
affirmative action treatment, respectively (p-values<0.00). The increase in performance
is the largest for the subsample of participants in the bottom third of the distribution
in the affirmative action treatment (those who received the 15 extra points in stage 2).
While participants in the bottom third of the distribution in the baseline treatment ob-
tained, on average, 1.67 more correct answers in stage 2, those in the affirmative action
treatment obtained 4.17 more correct answers (p-values are 0.12 and 0.00, respectively).
The difference between the two treatments is weakly statistically significant at the 10
percent level. The difference in performance progression between the baseline and affir-
mative action treatment for the participants who were ranked above the bottom third
in stage 1 (therefore, not eligible for affirmative action), is negative but not statistically
11
significant at conventional levels.
Table 3: Description of participants’ performance
Stage 1 Stage 2 Difference
mean sd mean sd mean sd
All
Baseline 25.09 6.84 27.50 8.89 2.42*** 5.71
Affirmative action 25.10 7.57 28.03 8.39 2.93*** 5.94
Difference 0.01 0.53 0.51
Bottom 3rd in Stage 1
Baseline 18.33 4.75 20.00 7.43 1.67 7.12
Affirmative action 17.09 5.12 21.26 7.80 4.17*** 7.09
Difference -1.24 1.26 2.5*
Above the bottom 3rd in Stage 1
Baseline 28.70 4.71 31.52 6.75 2.82*** 4.80
Affirmative action 29.30 4.72 31.57 6.26 2.27*** 5.17
Difference 0.60 0.05 -0.55
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We also show the performance distribution by treatment, for the whole sample in
Figure 2, for the subsample in the bottom third of the performance distribution in stage
1 in Figure 3, and for the subsample above the bottom third threshold in Figure 4.
12
Figure 2: Performance distribution: Whole sample
Figure 3: Performance distribution: Bottom 3rd in stage 1
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Figure 4: Performance distribution: Above the bottom 3rd in stage 1
A considerable heterogeneity in performance is noticeable in all figures. We contrast
the performance distribution in stage 1, stage 2 and the distribution of the variation in
performance between stages, across the baseline and affirmative action treatment, using
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The results with regards to performance in stage 1
(subfigures A and D) do not yield any significant differences between treatments (p-value
is 0.791 for the whole sample, 0.251 for the bottom third subsample and 0.347 for the
subsample above the bottom third). Similarly, the performance distribution in stage 2
(subfigures B and E) is not significantly different between the two treatments for each
of the samples considered (p-values are 0.608, 0.530 and 0.958). Turning now to the
progression in performance between the two stages (subfigures C and F), we also do not
observe any statistically significant differences at conventional levels between treatments
(p-values are 0.454, 0.119 and 0.700). Nonetheless, the systematic non-significant differ-
ences do not rule out differences in behaviour across the baseline and affirmative action
treatment. The absence of statistically significant results in our descriptive analysis may
be explained by a substantial heterogeneity in performance across participants combined
with our small sample size and potential heterogeneous effects of affirmative action for
participants with different characteristics.
In the following section, we describe the results obtained with the regression analysis,
which allows us to control for other factors that may affect the magnitude and statistical
significance of the treatment effect. These are individual level factors, specifically, gender,
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indigenous status, Year level, math scores and participants’ correct understanding of the
instructions, as well as session effects.
3.2 Regression results
We present the OLS regression results for the effect of affirmative action on participants’
performance and beliefs for their relative performance. We also examine the conse-
quences of affirmative action in terms of efficiency. We discuss the results focussing on
the subsample of participants who are ranked in the bottom third of the performance
distribution in stage 1. We also analyse the effect on the subsample of participants who
are not targeted but indirectly impacted by affirmative action. We systematically report
the results obtained with two specifications, a basic one and an extended specification
with additional covariates. In both specifications, the reported standard errors are ro-
bust and clustered by session, to account for the fact that the error term is unlikely to be
independent across observations within session. The basic model includes an indicator
variable for whether the participant is in the baseline or affirmative action treatment
(AA), an indicator variable for whether the participant was ranked in the bottom third
of the performance distribution in stage 1 (Bottom 3rd), and the interaction between
both variables. The extended model controls for gender, Year level, indigenous status,
math scores, and whether participants gave the correct answer when asked if they re-
ceived 15 extra points in stage 2 (Checkbonus). As mentioned in section 2.1, at the end
of the experiment all participants were asked to indicate whether they received 15 extra
points in the second stage. Eighty-eight percent of the participants gave the correct
answer. Among the 12 percent of participants who gave an incorrect answer, 3 percent
were in the baseline treatment and 9 percent in the affirmative action treatment. We
include a control variable, which takes the value 1 if the participant gave a correct an-
swer and 0 otherwise. Arguably participants’ incorrect understanding of whether they
received the extra points will attenuate the treatment effect. For comparative purposes,
we report in the appendix the results obtained when excluding the 35 participants who
gave an incorrect answer and briefly comment on the results obtained by their exclusion
throughout the description of the results in the following sections. Overall, excluding
these participants increases the magnitude and statistical significance of the treatment
effect. Finally, there are small variations in sample sizes between the basic and extended
specification, which are due to missing information on the math scores of 4 participants.9
9The principal teacher did not provide us information on these students’ math scores as they had
been enrolled in other schools in the school term prior to our experiment.
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3.2.1 Effect of affirmative action on effort
In Table 4, we report the effect of affirmative action on participants’ effort measured
by performance in stage 1, stage 2 and by the progression in performance between the
two stages. Our main estimates of interest are those for the variables AA x Bottom
3rd and AA. The former estimate corresponds to the effect of affirmative action on
the performance gap between participants ranked in the bottom third (who are eligible
for affirmative action) and those ranked above the bottom third.10 The estimate for
AA corresponds to the effect of affirmative action on performance for participants who
were ranked above the bottom third of the performance distribution in stage 1, and are
therefore indirectly penalised by affirmative action.11
We first look at the regression results with performance in stage 1 as the dependent
variable (columns 1a and 1b in Table 4). As expected, given that the experimental
instructions and the first stage of the task are identical for both treatments, none of our
treatment variables are statistically significant. By construction, participants ranked in
the bottom third have a lower performance than those ranked above the bottom third.
The estimate for the lower performance of participants ranked in the bottom third relative
to those ranked above, is slightly larger than 10 in both specifications (significant at 1
percent level). We also observe that participants with better math scores perform slightly
better. An increase in one unit on the math scores scale (1 to 5), on average, increases
performance by 0.68. Moreover, performance does not seem to be influenced by the
gender or indigenous status of the participants.12 Participants in Year 9 perform better,
by 1.61 units (significant at 10 percent level), than those in Year 8.
The regression results for performance in stage 2 (columns 2a and 2b in Table 4)
suggest that affirmative action does not affect performance in the task, as the coefficient
estimate for AA x Bottom 3rd, although positive, is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. However, looking at the variation in performance between the two
stages provides a better estimate of the treatment effect, by neutralising individual ef-
fects, which may be important given our relatively small sample. A similar approach is
to control for performance in stage 1 in the regression with performance in stage 2 as
the dependent variable.13 As reported in Table 4, we find that affirmative action leads
10The estimate for the interaction term AA x Bottom 3rd corresponds to [Y B3rdAA − Y B3rdBase ] −
[Y >B3rdAA − Y >B3rdBase ], where Y denotes performance, B3rd the group in the bottom third of the perfor-
mance distribution in stage 1 and > B3rd the group above the bottom third threshold.
11The estimate for the variable AA corresponds to [Y >B3rdAA − Y >B3rdBase ].
12The absence of gender differences in performance is line with the findings in the existing literature
(see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2013; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). These studies
systematically observe differences in competitive preferences between men and women, but not in average
performance in simple real-effort tasks analogous to the one used in our study.
13The results obtained are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the ones reported in this
section, and reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
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to an increase in performance for participants in the bottom third of the distribution
relative to those who are not eligible for affirmative action, by 3.1 units, significant at
the 5 percent level (columns 3a and 3b). The estimate confounds the effect of affirmative
action on those in the bottom third of the performance distribution who are benefit-
ted by affirmative action and any potential effect on the remaining participants who
are indirectly penalised by affirmative action. The latter is given by the estimate for
the variable Treatment AA, which is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The participants who are benefitted by affirmative action have a progression in perfor-
mance between the two stages that exceeds the one for their counterparts in the baseline
treatment by 2.5 units in the basic specification (column 3a) and 2.3 units when adding
additional control variables (column 3b).14 These coefficients are statistically significant
at conventional levels (p-values are 0.058 and 0.055, respectively). The magnitude of the
treatment effect is large, representing an increase in performance by approximately 50
percent relative to the baseline.
Finally, we observe that participants who reported correctly whether they received the
15 extra points in the final questionnaire have a larger improvement in performance by 1
unit, significant at 5 percent level. By excluding the 35 participants who gave an incorrect
answer, the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimate for AA x Bottom
3rd increases slightly. The estimate is 3.57 in the basic model and 3.59 in the extended
one, and affirmative action increases the performance gap between the two stages for
participants ranked in the bottom third by 3.15 and 2.91 correct answers, respectively (see
Table A.2 in Appendix A.1). The treatment effect on the lowest performers is statistically
significant at conventional levels (p-values are 0.024 and 0.021, respectively).15
14These values are obtained by adding the coefficient estimates for AA x Bottom 3rd and Treatment
AA.
15Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the findings in Calsamiglia et al.
(2013). In their experiment, controlling for participants’ ability in the task (with pre-test scores),
affirmative action increases performance of participants non-experienced at the task by about 4 units
and their average performance without affirmative action is 23 units.
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Table 4: OLS regressions on performance
Stage 1 Stage 2 Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Treatment AA 0.593 -0.033 0.044 -0.837 -0.549 -0.804
(0.901) (0.706) (1.130) (1.044) (0.530) (0.534)
Bottom 3rd -10.369∗∗∗ -10.180∗∗∗ -11.524∗∗∗ -10.925∗∗∗ -1.155 -0.745
(0.898) (0.918) (1.328) (1.291) (0.913) (0.950)
AA x Bottom 3rd -1.839 -1.650 1.216 1.433 3.056∗∗ 3.083∗∗
(1.279) (1.336) (1.643) (1.568) (1.389) (1.289)
Male 0.497 -0.450 -0.947∗
(0.729) (0.864) (0.540)
Year 9 1.611∗ 2.177∗∗∗ 0.566
(0.763) (0.732) (0.771)
Indigenous -0.452 -0.226 0.225
(0.756) (0.963) (0.625)
Math 0.679∗ 0.566 -0.113
(0.347) (0.478) (0.288)
Checkbonus -0.305 0.719 1.024∗∗
(0.838) (0.740) (0.478)
Constant 28.702∗∗∗ 13.091∗ 31.524∗∗∗ 11.117 2.821∗∗∗ -1.975
(0.797) (6.988) (0.941) (6.618) (0.378) (6.295)
N 263 259 263 259 263 259
Adj. R2 0.557 0.568 0.358 0.356 0.007 -0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Our results suggest that affirmative action does not influence the performance of par-
ticipants ranked above the bottom third in stage 1, even though they are indirectly pe-
nalised by affirmative action. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates obtained in Table 4
for the variable Treatment AA are informative about the average effect for participants
whose performance exceeds the affirmative action eligibility threshold. We now test for
potential heterogeneous effects of affirmative action according to participants’ perfor-
mance in the task. Our total number of participants who are not eligible for affirmative
action in stage 2 allows us to restrict our analysis to this subsample. We report in Ta-
ble 5 our regression results, which include an interaction term between the treatment
variable and performance in stage 1.16 The coefficient estimate for Treatment AA gives
us the effect of affirmative action for participants with a very low performance in stage 1
(just above the bottom third threshold). The positive estimates suggest that affirmative
action enhances performance for participants with a very low performance in stage 1.
16Looking at performance in stage 2 and at the difference in performance across the two stages yields
exactly the same results, given that we interact the treatment variable with the performance in stage 1
and control for performance in stage 1.
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However, the coefficient is only weakly statistically significant (at the 10 percent level)
in the basic specification (columns 1a) and not statistically significant at conventional
levels in the extended model (column 1b). In addition, we observe that affirmative ac-
tion has a discouraging effect for participants with a higher performance in stage 1. The
estimate for AA x Stage 1 is negative (approximately -0.2) and weakly significant in
both specifications. These results are in line with Calsamiglia et al. (2013), who find
that affirmative action does not affect the average performance of participants who do
not benefit from the policy, but that it positively affects those with a low performance
level (at a decreasing rate) and has a negative impact on participants with the highest
performance in the task.
We also present in Table A.3 in Appendix A.1 the regression results obtained when
excluding the participants who incorrectly reported whether the received the 15 extra
points (accounting for 20 observations). As previously, the results do not qualitatively
change, but their magnitude and statistical significance slightly increases (the estimate
for AA x Stage 1 is approximately -0.3 in both specifications).
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Table 5: OLS regressions on performance
Difference (S2 - S1)
(1a) (1b)
Treatment AA 6.150∗ 5.809
(3.338) (3.616)
Stage 1 0.009 0.019
(0.049) (0.059)
AA x Stage 1 -0.229∗ -0.211∗
(0.116) (0.120)
Male -1.637∗∗
(0.750)
Year 9 -0.541
(0.749)
Indigenous -0.032
(0.722)
Math -0.245
(0.304)
Checkbonus 0.965
(0.724)
Constant 2.564 7.539
(1.687) (6.888)
N 172 172
Adj. R2 0.008 0.009
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clus-
tered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
3.2.2 Effect of affirmative action on beliefs for relative performance
We now investigate whether affirmative action influences beliefs for relative performance.
We present the results in Table 6, where the dependent variable is participants’ percentile
rank guess.17 Note that a positive (negative) coefficient estimate for the dependent
variables corresponds to lower (higher) rank expectations. The estimates for the variables
AA x Bottom 3rd and Treatment AA on the variation in expectations between the
two stages are not statistically different from zero (columns 3a and 3b), suggesting that
affirmative action does not influence participants’ expectations for their rank. This result
is also in line with the findings in Calsamiglia et al. (2013).
17In the experiment participants were asked to guess their rank between 1 and the total number of
participants in the session. We converted their answers in percentile rank guesses by dividing their
expected rank by the total number of participants in the session.
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We also observe that participants with a higher actual rank in stage 1 expect to
be ranked higher in stage 1 by 14 percentile points, significant at the 10 percent level
(columns 1a and 1b). Similarly, participants with a higher actual rank in stage 2 ex-
pect to be ranked higher in stage 2 by 21 percentile points significant at the 1 percent
level (columns 2a and 2b). Moreover, indigenous participants systematically expect to
be ranked lower than their non-indigenous counterparts, by approximately 8 percentile
points, significant at the 1 percent level. This is an interesting observation given the
absence of differences in performance in the task between indigenous and non-indigenous
participants. Another interesting result is that we do not have strong evidence that male
participants are more confident with respect to their relative performance than females.
The estimate for the variable male is systematically negative in our regressions, but not
statistically significant at conventional levels.18 When excluding the subsample of par-
ticipants who gave an incorrect answer to whether they received the extra points, the
results do not change qualitatively or quantitatively (see Table A.4 in Appendix A.1).
As for performance in the previous section, we test whether the impact of affirmative
action on beliefs for relative performance is dependent on the actual rank, for partici-
pants with a performance level above the bottom third threshold. There is no evidence
that the non-statistically significant average effect countervails heterogeneous effects (see
Table A.5 in Appendix A.1).
18The results is also observed in Calsamiglia et al. (2013).
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Table 6: OLS regressions on expected percentile ranks
Stage 1 Stage 2 Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Treatment AA -0.031 -0.028 -0.010 -0.015 0.023 0.016
(0.030) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.018) (0.020)
Bottom 3rd -0.010 -0.017 0.023 0.012 0.039 0.036
(0.044) (0.048) (0.038) (0.041) (0.033) (0.040)
AA x Bottom 3rd -0.019 0.000 0.026 0.045 0.035 0.034
(0.056) (0.060) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048)
Male -0.020 -0.034 -0.011
(0.022) (0.020) (0.024)
Year 9 -0.019 -0.007 0.012
(0.032) (0.022) (0.025)
Math 0.020 0.009 -0.013
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
Indigenous 0.084∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Checkbonus 0.057 0.048 -0.013
(0.043) (0.038) (0.023)
Rank in stage 1 0.145∗ 0.143∗
(0.070) (0.070)
Rank in stage 2 0.205∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067)
Constant 0.279∗∗∗ 0.309 0.279∗∗∗ 0.262 0.032∗∗ -0.001
(0.036) (0.304) (0.038) (0.217) (0.014) (0.238)
N 263 259 263 259 263 259
Adj. R2 0.027 0.049 0.088 0.096 0.031 0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.2.3 Effect of affirmative action on efficiency
In this section, we describe how affirmative action affects the pool of participants in
the top third of the performance distribution who receive the high piece-rate payoff. A
recurrent argument against affirmative action is the constraint it imposes on matching
candidates who are expected to be the most productive at the task, in favour of individu-
als expected to be less productive who would not be selected in the absence of affirmative
action. Our task does not require a participant to acquire specific skills to increase his or
her performance beyong higher effort. Hence, it allows to investigate whether affirmative
action is likely to raise individuals’ effort enough, so that it does not induce a lower av-
erage performance of those who receive the high piece-rate payment in the second stage
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and even increases overall performance.
In what follows, we look at how affirmative action influences the chances of a partic-
ipant with a low performance to be ranked in the top third in the second stage and how
it affects the overall performance of the participants receiving the high piece-rate payoff.
In Table 7, we report the number of participants who were ranked in the bottom third
in stage 1 and in the top third in stage 2, as well as the number of participants who
were ranked in the top third in stage 1 and below the top third in stage 2, separately by
treatment. Overall, affirmative action leads to substantial changes in the composition
of the group of participants receiving the high and the low piece-rate payments. In the
baseline treatment, only 2 of the participants who were ranked in the bottom third in
the first stage, were ranked in the top third in the second stage of the task. In contrast,
in the affirmative action treatment, 22 participants who were ranked in the bottom third
in stage 1 were ranked in the top third in stage 2. Among those who were ranked in
the top third in stage 1, 11 were ranked below the top third in the second stage in the
baseline treatment, whereas 24 were ranked below the top third in the affirmative action
treatment.
The advantage given to participants in the bottom third of the performance distri-
bution in the affirmative action treatment was large, which strongly accounts for the
important promotion of the low performers in stage 2. It is also interesting to look at
how many participants in the bottom third in stage 1 would have been promoted to the
top third based on their real rank in stage 2, that is, based on their number of correct
answers only. When considering participants’ real relative performance, we observe that
only 5 would be promoted from the bottom third to the top third in stage 2. Although
the number is very small, it represents an increase by 150 percent relative to the baseline.
Likewise, a smaller number of participants, 14, would be moved from the top third.
Table 7: Variation in the composition of the top 3rd
Baseline Affirmative
action
N N
Rank in S1: bottom 3rd; Rank in S2: top 3rd 2 22
Rank in S1: top 3rd; Rank in S2: below top 3rd 11 24
Rank in S1: bottom 3rd; Real rank in S2: top 3rd - 5
Rank in S1: top 3rd; Real rank in S2: below top 3rd - 14
Total no. of participants ranked top 3rd 40 44
Total no. of participants ranked below top 3rd 89 90
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In Table 8, we report the OLS regression results on participants’ chances of being
ranked in the top third in stage 2. The results are consistent with our observations above,
as affirmative increases the chances for an individual ranked in the bottom third in stage
1 of getting the high piece-rate payment in stage 2 by 0.655, statistically significant at 1
percent level.
Table 8: OLS regressions on the prob. of being
in the top 3rd in stage 2
(1a) (1b)
Treatment AA -0.190∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.038)
Bottom 3rd -0.396∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045)
AA x Bottom 3rd 0.624∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.068)
Male -0.013
(0.054)
Year 9 0.119∗∗
(0.054)
Indigenous -0.056
(0.047)
Math 0.039
(0.032)
Checkbonus -0.009
(0.053)
Constant 0.440∗∗∗ -0.653
(0.017) (0.486)
N 263 259
Adj. R2 0.099 0.109
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In Table 9, we report the regression results on the probability of being ranked in the
top third in stage 2, based on the real rank in stage 2. The estimate for the interaction
term AA x Bottom 3rd is positive, but not statistically different from zero.
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Table 9: OLS regressions on the prob. of being
in the top 3rd in stage 2, based on real ranks
(1a) (1b)
Treatment AA 0.003 -0.025
(0.027) (0.042)
Bottom 3rd -0.396∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.046)
AA x Bottom 3rd 0.062 0.072
(0.071) (0.068)
Male -0.066
(0.063)
Year 9 0.048
(0.058)
Indigenous 0.027
(0.050)
Math 0.021
(0.035)
Checkbonus 0.021
(0.058)
Constant 0.440∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.017) (0.476)
N 263 259
Adj. R2 0.131 0.119
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Lastly, we describe how affirmative action impacted overall performance in Table 10.
When looking at the whole sample, we do not observe a significant difference in aver-
age performance between treatments. The average number of correct answers in the
baseline treatment in stage 2 is 27.5 and 28.03 in the affirmative action treatment (p-
value=0.622). However, there are heterogeneous distributional effects. For participants
ranked in the top third in stage 2, their average performance in the baseline treatment
exceeds the one of their counterparts in the affirmative action treatment by 3.48 units
(p-value=0.009). Similarly, for participants ranked below the top third in stage 2, their
average performance in the baseline treatment is lower than in the affirmative action
treatment by 1.96 units (p-value=0.072). These observations suggest that, by promoting
individuals with a relatively low performance, affirmative action does not affect overall
performance. Nonetheless, it decreases average performance of participants receiving the
high piece-rate payment and increases the one of those receiving the low piece-rate pay-
ment. That is not unexpected given that, as described in Table 7, a very large number
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of participants ranked in the bottom third in stage 1 are promoted to the top third in
the second stage by affirmative action.
Table 10: Average performance in stage 2
Baseline Affirmative action Diff.
Whole sample 27.50 28.03 0.53
Top 3rd 37.15 33.66 - 3.49***
Below top 3rd 23.32 25.28 1.96*
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated how affirmative action impacts performance in a simple
real-effort task, with a competitive setting and monetary incentives. The experiments
were conducted in the classroom with 263 students aged 13 to 15, in Australian schools
with a large representation of indigenous students and similar low socioeconomic indi-
cators. In the experiment, participants performed the same effort-based task twice. In
each stage participants in the top third of the performance distribution received a high
piece-rate payment, while the remaining participants received a low piece-rate payment.
In half of the experimental sessions, our affirmative action treatment, we offered a posi-
tive handicap to all participants in the bottom third of the performance distribution in
the first stage, increasing their chances of reaching the top third in the second stage and
thereby, receiving the high piece-rate payment. In the other half of the experimental
sessions, our baseline treatment, the second stage was identical to the first stage. Our
results indicate that participants who benefit from affirmative action increase their effort
in the task. On average, affirmative action increases the gap in performance between the
two stages, by approximately 50 percent relative to the baseline. Moreover, our results
suggest that any potential discouraging effects on those who are indirectly penalised by
affirmative action are small. With regards to efficiency, we do not find that affirmative
reduces overall performance. However, it decreases average performance of participants
in the top third who receive a high piece-rate payment, and increases performance of the
remaining participants, receiving a low piece-rate payment. This is explained by the fact
that our affirmative action policy led to a large promotion of low performing participants
into the top third.
The innovation of our study lies on the specificity of the participant pool, students
in disadvantaged high schools with a large representation of indigenous Australians and
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which have positive discrimination programs in place. Our participant pool increases the
significance and external validity of our findings. In Australia, many special programs are
implemented in schools and universities to encourage and support indigenous students to
exert effort in school and raise their educational performance and aspirations. Also, both
governmental and private employers, have non-binding affirmative action rules in place
to increase participation of indigenous Australians. Another aspect that differentiates
our study from the existing literature is that we apply affirmative action based on actual
relative performance in a pure effort task.
In sum, our study shows that affirmative action is an effective policy tool to en-
courage effort of low achieving students and thereby reduce patterns of inequality in
education. Importantly, even a very salient affirmative action policy in favour of low
achieving students at best only weakly discourages those above the eligibility threshold.
A limitation of our study is that, due to sample size considerations, we are unable to test
for heterogeneity in response to affirmative action of different social groups (for instance,
indigenous versus non-indigenous, male versus female). This is an interesting question for
future research, given the substantial evidence that individual characteristics are relevant
predictors of behaviour in many contexts.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional regression results
Table A.1: OLS regressions on performance
Stage 2
(1a) (1b)
Treatment AA -0.434 -0.811
(0.577) (0.609)
Bottom 3rd -3.166∗∗ -2.810∗
(1.315) (1.392)
AA x Bottom 3rd 2.699∗ 2.749∗∗
(1.310) (1.192)
Stage 1: Nb of correct answers 0.806∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.071)
Male -0.846
(0.536)
Year 9 0.893
(0.780)
Indigenous 0.134
(0.645)
Math 0.025
(0.283)
Checkbonus 0.962∗∗
(0.427)
Constant 8.388∗∗∗ 0.680
(2.174) (5.302)
N 263 259
Adj. R2 0.557 0.548
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by session.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.2: OLS regressions on performance
Stage 1 Stage 2 Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Treatment AA 0.348 -0.254 -0.074 -0.936 -0.421 -0.682
(0.904) (0.720) (1.085) (1.052) (0.540) (0.658)
Bottom 3rd -10.613∗∗∗ -10.460∗∗∗ -11.986∗∗∗ -11.522∗∗∗ -1.373 -1.062
(0.939) (0.922) (1.375) (1.308) (0.910) (0.956)
AA x Bottom 3rd -1.957 -2.133 1.611 1.462 3.568∗∗ 3.595∗∗
(1.484) (1.531) (1.630) (1.615) (1.439) (1.370)
Male 0.909 -0.214 -1.123∗
(0.744) (0.912) (0.603)
Year 9 1.915∗∗ 2.006∗∗ 0.091
(0.870) (0.807) (0.796)
Indigenous -0.190 0.176 0.365
(0.801) (1.174) (0.774)
Math 0.585 0.231 -0.354
(0.348) (0.441) (0.312)
Constant 28.899∗∗∗ 10.529 31.772∗∗∗ 14.439∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 3.910
(0.801) (7.948) (0.904) (7.350) (0.368) (6.465)
N 228 224 228 224 228 224
Adj. R2 0.553 0.564 0.383 0.369 0.013 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.3: OLS regressions on perfor-
mance
Difference (S2-S1)
(1a) (1b)
Treatment AA 7.764∗ 7.278∗
(3.686) (4.090)
Stage 1 0.002 0.022
(0.052) (0.062)
AA x Stage 1 -0.280∗∗ -0.264∗
(0.123) (0.132)
Male -1.320∗
(0.730)
Year 9 -0.531
(0.826)
Indigenous 0.288
(0.838)
Math -0.240
(0.312)
Checkbonus 0.000
(.)
Constant 2.807 8.137
(1.753) (7.439)
N 152 152
Adj. R2 0.021 0.015
Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: OLS regressions on expected percentile ranks
Stage 1 Stage 2 Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Treatment AA -0.029 -0.045 -0.000 -0.024 0.029 0.022
(0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.020) (0.021)
Bottom 3rd 0.009 -0.001 0.048 0.032 0.042 0.038
(0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041)
AA x Bottom 3rd -0.055 -0.030 -0.036 -0.012 0.011 0.008
(0.046) (0.048) (0.043) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056)
Male -0.015 -0.021 -0.001
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Year 9 -0.009 0.004 0.016
(0.035) (0.027) (0.027)
Math 0.019 0.007 -0.012
(0.017) (0.011) (0.013)
Indigenous 0.100∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.026) (0.022) (0.014)
Rank in stage 1 0.134∗ 0.133∗
(0.066) (0.073)
Rank in stage 2 0.178∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(0.064) (0.067)
Constant 0.288∗∗∗ 0.297 0.294∗∗∗ 0.228 0.030∗ -0.057
(0.035) (0.322) (0.036) (0.227) (0.017) (0.247)
N 228.000 224.000 228.000 224.000 228.000 224.000
Adj. R2 0.033 0.053 0.067 0.075 0.017 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: OLS regressions on expected ranks
Difference in expected ranks (S2-S1)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Treatment AA 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 -0.019
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036)
Rank in stage 1 0.154∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.124∗∗
(0.043) (0.038) (0.053) (0.056)
AA x Rank in stage 1 0.041 0.067 0.085 0.106
(0.082) (0.074) (0.083) (0.090)
Male -0.017 -0.021
(0.024) (0.027)
Year 9 0.019 0.016
(0.025) (0.023)
Math -0.027∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Indigenous -0.009 0.001
(0.029) (0.030)
Checkbonus 0.010
(0.032)
Constant -0.023 -0.077 -0.025 -0.040
(0.023) (0.233) (0.024) (0.223)
N 172 172 152 152
Adj. R2 0.038 0.043 0.057 0.070
Columns (1a) and (1b) give the coefficient estimates obtianed for the whole
sample of participants ranked above the bottom third in stage 1; columns (2a)
and (2b) give the coefficient estimates for the sample of participants ranked
above the bottom third in stage 1, excluding those who incorrectly reported
whether they received the extra points. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.2 Experimental instructions
Welcome
Thank you for taking part in this session! It will be fun and you will earn real money.
You will get the money in cash at the end of the session.
What you will do:
You will perform the same task twice and then answer a short questionnaire. How much
effort you put in the task will determine how much money you get. At the end of the
session, one of the two stages of the task will be randomly picked for payment. Your
final earnings will consist of $7 for your participation, plus up to another $7, depending
on your performance in the stage picked for payment. We will now explain in detail
what you will be doing in the task and go through examples. While we go through the
instructions, please only proceed to the next screen when we ask you to do so. It is very
important that you listen carefully to the explanations and you are encouraged to ask
questions. Once you start performing the task, you can still raise your hand if you have
any question and one of us will come and answer it privately. You must perform the task
and answer all questions individually, so please do not talk to your neighbours during
the session.
Wait screen
Stage 1: The task
We will now describe in detail stage 1.
You will have 8 minutes to answer questions similar to the one that you see now on your
screen.
In each question, your task is to count the number of shaded squares in a grid with a
total of 50 squares (the grid has 5 rows and 10 columns), and enter this number in the
empty box as indicated on your screen. In the example, the number of shaded squares
in the grid is 20. You would write the number 20 in the empty box.
Once you enter your answer, you need to press the button Continue on the bottom
right of the screen. Then, a new grid will appear and you will be asked the exact same
question.
You will have 8 minutes to answer as many questions as you can.
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Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better?
OK, please press the button Continue.
Stage 1: Your earnings
Your earnings will depend on two things: your number of correct answers and whether
you are one of the students in the room who had the highest number of correct answers
in the task.
This is how your earnings will be calculated:
If your number of correct answers places you within the top third of students, you get
15 cents per correct answer. If you are not among the top third of students with the
highest score, you get 5 cents per correct answer.
In this room you are X students. Those ranked A or above will receive 15 cents per
correct answer. All the others will get 5 cents per correct answer.
Let’s consider a first example.
A student answered 40 questions correctly and is ranked A (within the top third). He
earns 40*$0.15.
Let’s now turn to a second example.
A student answered 15 questions correctly and is ranked B (below the top third). He
earns 15*$0.05.
What if two or more students get exactly the same score, how are the ranks allocated?
Ties will be broken randomly. For instance, if the 3rd ranked student answered 32
questions correctly, and two students answered 31 questions correctly, then one of them
will be ranked 4th and the other 5th.
Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better?
OK, please press the button Continue.
Stage 1: Guess your rank
Once the 8 minutes are over, you will be asked to guess how well you did in the task
compared to the other X students in the room. You can choose any number between 1
and X+1 for your rank.
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For instance, if you think that you had the highest number of correct answers, your guess
for your rank will be 1.
If you think that you had the second highest number of correct answers, your guess for
your rank will be 2.
If you think that you had the lowest number of correct answers, your guess for your rank
will be X+1.
You will need to enter the number corresponding to your guess for your rank in the box,
as you can now see on your screen.
Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better?
OK, please press the button Continue.
Stage 1: Your score
At the end of Stage 1, you will be informed about your number of correct answers in
Stage 1 and whether your score in Stage 1 was in the top third or not.
Stage 2: The task
We will now describe stage 2.
In stage 2, the task is exactly the same as in stage 1. Again, you will be given 8 minutes
to solve as many questions as you can.
Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better?
OK, please press the button Continue.
Stage 2: Your earnings
The difference with stage 1 is that, in stage 2, your earnings may be determined differently
than in stage 1. There are two possible cases:
- 1/3 of the students in the room receive 15 extra points added to their number of
correct answers to calculate their score in stage 2.
- Nobody receives any extra points.
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Let’s consider the case where 1/3 of the students in the room receive the 15 extra points.
Scores are determined as follows:
If you receive the 15 extra points, your score will be determined by your number of
correct answers, plus the 15 extra points.
If you do not receive the extra points, your score will be determined by your number of
correct answers only.
If your score is within the top third, you get 15 cents per correct answer. If it is not,
you get 5 cents per correct answer. Note that if you receive the extra points, it is easier
for you to be in the top third than if you do not receive the extra points. However, you
only receive money for your correct answers.
Let’s consider an example:
A student received the extra points and answered 18 questions correctly in stage 2. His
or her score will be equal to 18 + 15
If the score 33 is within the top third, he or she will receive 18 x 15 cents = $2.7
If the score 18 + 15 is not within the top third, he or she will receive 18 x 5 cents = $0.9
Let’s consider another example:
A student did not receive any extra points and got 40 correct answers in stage 2.
His or her score will be equal to 40 + 0.
Again, if the score 40 is within the top third, he or she will receive 40 x15 cents, and 40
x 5 cents otherwise.
Let’s now consider the case where nobody receives any extra points:
In that case, your earnings are determined exactly as in Stage 1.
Remember that in Stage 2 not everybody will receive the extra points. If extra points
are given out, only 1/3 of the students will receive extra points. If no extra points are
given out, nobody receives any extra points.
Before performing Stage 2, you will be informed whether any students received the extra
points, and if so, whether you are one of these students.
Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better? OK, please press the button Continue.
Stage 2: Guess your rank
As in stage 1, you will be asked to guess how well you did in in Stage 2 compared to the
other X students in the room. You can choose any number between 1 and X+1 for your
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guess for the rank of your score.
You will need to enter the number corresponding to your guess for the rank of your score
in the box, as you can now see on your screen.
Do you have any questions? Is there something which you would like me to explain
better?
OK, please press the button Continue.
Final questionnaire
Once you have completed Stage 1 and Stage 2, you will be asked to answer a short
questionnaire.
Last screen before starting
You will now start. Before performing each stage, you will have a short explanation
screen reminding you the instructions for the stage you are about to perform.
You will also have screens indicating you to wait before continuing. When you are on a
wait screen, please do not click continue before we invite you to do so. Also, it is very
important that you stay quiet and do not talk to your neighbours. You will only have
to wait a few seconds.
Remember that although you will have the possibility to earn money in both stages of
the task, only one stage, randomly picked, will be paid in the end. If you have any
question while performing the task, please raise your hand and one of us will come and
answer your question privately.
Once you have finished, please remain seated until and quiet until everybody has com-
pleted all the tasks. Once everybody has finished, you will receive your earnings privately
and then get back to your normal school activities.
Do you have any questions before starting the task?
If you are ready to start, please press the button READY.
Wait screen
Wait screen after stage 1:
You will now be told about your score in stage 1 and whether you were in the top third.
You will then be told that:
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AA:
1/3 of the students in the room will receive the extra points in stage 2. Please read the
information displayed on the screens carefully as you will be informed whether you are
one of the students who received the extra points
Baseline:
nobody will receive extra points in stage 2.
A.3 Screenshots
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